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Introduction 
For well over a decade, firms have increasingly sought to improve their profitability and competitive 
position in markets by looking beyond firm boundaries and towards their supply chains. As firms 
transition their relationships with supply chain partners from transactional to collaborative, the strength 
and effectiveness of the partnerships is in part reliant on the extent to which they share information (Kim 
et al. 2006). Information sharing allows supply chain partners to improve forecasts, synchronize 
production and delivery, coordinate inventory-related decisions, and develop a shared understanding of 
performance bottlenecks (Rai et al. 2006; Simchi-Levi et al. 2007). Additionally, information sharing 
provides firms in the supply chain network visibility, and reinforces the collaborative nature of the 
relationship and the ability to respond in a timely fashion to supply and demand signals (Patnayakuni et 
al. 2006; Zhou et al. 2007).   
Given the critical role played by information sharing in supply chains, the topic is of interest to 
researchers in operations management, marketing and information systems among other disciplines (see 
Patnayakuni et al. 2006 for a review of the literature).  However, much of this research focuses on 
examining the consequences of information sharing on various outcomes ranging from improved visibility 
to gains in supply chain performance (Hsu et al. 2008; Klein et al. 2009). Klein and Rai (2009) point out 
there has been limited attention on the factors that shape information sharing between supply chain 
partners. The few studies that have examined such factors have looked at trust beliefs (Klein et al. 2009), 
IT infrastructure integration  (Rai et al. 2006), and relational preconditions in the form of relationship 
specific assets, interaction routines and long-term orientation towards supply chain partners 
(Patnayakuni et al. 2006).  
Most of these studies adopt the relational view of the firm and/or the traditional economic view of firm 
behavior, usually drawing on transaction cost economics to examine the effects of relation-specific factors 
on information sharing. To complement the more traditional economic and relational account of firm 
behavior, we draw upon institutional theory and strategic management literature to account for the 
strategic position of the focal firm and its embeddedness in  institutional networks (Palmer et al. 1993). 
Specifically, we argue that the information sharing behavior of the focal firm is shaped by internal 
strategic factors in the form of top management’s participation in articulating a strategy for the supply 
chain and its relational orientation, relation-specific power factors that examine the pressures placed 
upon supply chain partners and external institutional factors arising from currently prevalent industry 
and professional practices. Furthermore, existing research implicitly assumes that suppliers and buyers 
share the same views and motivations for information sharing. Some recent studies on supplier-buyer 
relationships have pointed out that suppliers and buyers may have different motivations for collaboration 
and benefit differently from the relationship (e.g., Nyaga, 2010). Comparing and contrasting the factors 
that influence information sharing from supplier and buyer perspectives would provide us with useful 
insights on upstream and downstream supply chain relationships. In this study we attempt to fill these 
gaps.  Specifically, we address the following two research questions: 
RQ1: How do internal strategic, relation-specific power and external institutional factors affect 
information sharing in supply chains? 
RQ2: How do suppliers and buyers differ in their perspectives on the factors influencing 
information sharing? 
Our study makes the following contributions: (i) we highlight the importance of top management 
participation and relational orientation on shaping the information sharing behavior in supply chain 
management; (ii) we delineate the effects of partners’ coercive power on the firm and power by the firm 
on its partners to influence information sharing in supply chains;  (iii) we extend the current studies on 
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supply chain management that focus on the strategic choices of the focal firm to include the institutional 
influences from peers and other firms in the industry; and (iv) we compare and contrast the impacts of 
these strategic, power, and institutional factors on information sharing by suppliers and buyers to 
examine similarities and differences.  
The paper proceeds with the theoretical foundations for our research model and each of our hypotheses. 
We follow this with a description of the research methodology and the empirical results. We then discuss 
the theoretical and practical implications that can be drawn from the results. 
Theoretical Development 
Increasingly, firms have adopted a collaborative approach with their supply chain partners, engaging in 
collaborative practices for planning, forecasting, replenishment, inventory management and scheduling; 
all of which are predicated on sharing information (Yigitbasioglu 2010). Initiatives to foster collaboration 
have gained momentum with the availability of advanced interorganizational information systems that 
provide digital platforms for information sharing over public or private networks such as the Internet (Rai 
et al. 2006). The structure of supply chains is such that information is distributed across firm boundaries 
where inaccessibility and delay can lead to reduced information visibility, poor levels of interaction, and 
mismatches between demand and supply (Lee et al. 1997; Zhou et al. 2007). One often-quoted problem 
caused by poor information visibility is the bullwhip effect where amplified order variation occurs as 
demand signals travel across the supply chain; resulting in significant market mediation costs from stock-
outs and stockpiles at different locations in the supply chain (Simchi-Levi et al. 2007). In new product 
markets and in hypercompetitive environments which are characterized by high levels of uncertainty, 
information sharing can mitigate the effects of coping with emergent demand patterns (Fine 2000). Thus, 
information sharing provides members of a supply chain network with visibility across the supply chain, 
reinforces the collaborative nature of relationships, and the ability to respond in a timely fashion to supply 
and demand changes (Hsu et al. 2008; Patnayakuni et al. 2006; Zhou et al. 2007). Building systems and 
interorganizational platforms to support such collaboration need a better understanding of what 
motivates firms to share information with their supply chain partners. 
Information sharing with supply chain partners, referred to as information sharing in this study is the 
extent to which critical private information is conveyed to firm’s partners so as to allow them to interpret, 
sense and anticipate change in their supply chain (Gosain et al. 2004; Nyaga et al. 2010). In order to 
accomplish this, firms need to share information in a broad range of areas. This may include sharing 
order information from routine transactions, production-related information about resource conditions 
and plans, financial information related to revenue and profit-related metrics, and marketing related 
information for competitive positioning (Seidmann et al. 1997).  Going beyond exchanging simple 
transactional information, information sharing as considered here allows firms to sense the needs of 
partners and in turn communicate their needs to supply chain partners (Gosain et al. 2004). As a contrast 
to the traditional economic account of firm behavior adopted by most prior research, in this study we 
examine information sharing in supply chains as shaped by the strategic (top management participation 
and relational orientation), power (coercive power on and by the firm) and institutional factors (mimetic 
and normative forces) (Figure 1).  
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Strategic Management of Supply Chain 
The manner in which the focal firm views the supply chain and pursues its supply chain strategy 
influences its information sharing behavior with its partners. The focal firm’s view of the role of supply 
chain can be captured by the extent of participation of its top management, which is defined as the 
behavior and actions performed by the top management (Liang et al. 2007) to facilitate supply chain 
management. Information sharing among partners requires substantial material and managerial 
resources to set up the data exchange protocols and routines among partners. Top management can 
convey the strategic role of supply chain management by articulating its vision for managing the supply 
chain and formulating related strategy. By publicly championing the strategic role of supply chain 
management it lends legitimacy to supply chain initiatives including sharing information with partners. 
Such legitimacy is especially important to overcome the security concerns and inertia often associated 
with information sharing among employees. Top management participation creates the incentive to 
facilitate and initiate supply chain collaboration activities with partners, increasing the range of 
information shared among partners. Thus, we posit, 
H1: Higher level top management participation in articulating and formulating supply chain strategy 
leads to a higher extent of information sharing with partners 
Relational orientation is defined as the focal firm’s approach to relationship building with supply chain 
partners (Garbarino et al. 1999; Sharma et al. 2003). Research from multiple disciplinary perspectives has 
suggested that value from network membership is realized through cooperative behavior (Patnayakuni et 
al. 2006).  As more and more firms strategically move away from adversarial relationships to collaborative 
ones (Nyaga et al. 2010), relational orientation of a firm towards its partners will be characterized by long-
term considerations, mutual gains, and informal governance; a strategic consideration in managing its 
supply chain. Relational orientation can affect information sharing in the following ways. First, effective 
collaboration usually requires sharing proprietary information which may expose the firm to 
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with partners is associated with both trust (Anderson et al. 1989) and dependence (Ganesan 1994), which 
can offset concerns about opportunistic behaviors and abuse of shared information by partners. Second, 
the expectation for mutual gains from the relationship in the long run makes partners willing to invest in 
relational-specific assets and to develop “experience-based assets,” facilitating efficient communication 
and information exchange (Williamson 1985). Therefore, we posit, 
H2: A higher level of relational orientation leads to a higher extent of information sharing with partners 
Power forces among the partners: 
Power is defined as the capability of a firm to exert influence on other firms to act in a prescribed manner 
(Hart et al. 1997). Our definition for power is slightly different from the coercive pressure in institutional 
theory, in which it may stem from a variety of sources including resource-dominant organizations, 
regulatory bodies, and parent corporations and is usually considered as unidirectional. In this study, we 
focus on the specific power wielded by supply chain partners since they are in a unique position of not 
only affecting normal day-to-day operations but also in realizing the strategic objectives of the focal firm. 
Since suppliers and buyers get into exchange relationships for mutual gain and power can be exercised in 
different ways (Hart et al. 1997), we argue that power can be bilateral in supply chain relationships, i.e., a 
focal firm can both be subject to the coercive power of its partners as well as exert power on its partners. 
In the supply chain context, suppliers and buyers depend on each other to obtain resources for day-to-day 
operations, profitability and the long-term viability of the firm. Coercive power can thus stem from such 
dependence to influence the partners’ plausible choices and actions (Pfeffer et al. 2003). For instance, 
General Motors was successful in “persuading” its car dealers to tender payment for the vehicles sold 
through ACH debit transfers (Knudson et al. 1994). Recently, Wal-Mart has requested its top suppliers to 
implement RFID if they want to continue their relationships with Wal-Mart. Therefore, 
H3: A higher level of coercive power on the firm by its partners leads to a higher extent of information 
sharing with partners 
Similarly, if the focal firm is in a dominant position, it can exert its coercive power on its partners to share 
information. If the focal firm is not in a dominant position, it can also influence the resource-dominant 
firms’ actions through negotiation, mutual-adjustment and their investment in relationship specific assets 
(Subramani et al. 2003). In addition, since information sharing is usually bilateral and involves private 
information, the focal firm may be more willing to share information with its partners when it feels that it 
is in relative position of power over its partners. Thus,  
H4: A higher level of coercive power on the partners by the focal firm leads to a higher extent of 
information sharing with partners 
Institutional forces on Supply Chain Management 
In addition to the strategic factors and the influence of power between partners, we argue that the 
information sharing behavior of the focal firm is in addition to and subject to the influence of the 
institutional environment in which the firm is situated. Drawing from the institutional perspective, we 
examine the impacts of mimetic and normative forces on information sharing.  
Mimetic influences may cause a firm to change over time to become more like other firms in its 
environment (DiMaggio et al. 1983). Mimetic influences manifest themselves in two ways: the prevalence 
of a practice in the focal firm’s industry and the perceived success of firms that have adopted the practice 
(Haveman 1993). Extending this logic into the context of this study, we define mimetic influence on 
supply chain management as the extent to which the focal firm mimics the actions of other firms on 
supply chain management initiatives. If information sharing has been widely adopted in the focal firm’s 
industry, the focal firm may model itself after other firms to acquire status-conferring legitimacy or social 
fitness in a wider social structure (DiMaggio et al. 1983). In addition, the focal firm may attribute the 
success of other firms to their supply chain practices, such as information sharing, and may perceive the 
need to adopt such practices to maintain parity, prevent loss of market share or simply the desire to 
replicate practices with the expectation of improved performance.  Accordingly we propose the 
hypothesis, 
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H5: A higher level of mimetic influence on supply chain management of the firm leads to a higher extent 
of information sharing with partners 
Normative influences are considered to occur primarily as a result of professionalization (DiMaggio et al. 
1983). As supply chain practices including information sharing become prevalent and widely accepted, 
they become a part of the knowledge pool that is institutionalized to become a part of the curricula in 
higher education programs, professional certifications, continuing education and dissemination through 
professional and trade associations.  Professionals who have similar formal education and are employed 
at similar positions in different firms are likely to exhibit similarity in how they perform their tasks and 
consequently the importance they attribute to certain priorities, work practices and structures. Thus, 
normative influence on information sharing, defined as the extent to which the focal firm is influenced by 
professionals and associated institutions.  
H6: A higher level of normative influence on supply chain management of the firm leads to a higher 
extent of information sharing with partners 
Comparing supplier and buyer perspectives on information sharing 
While suppliers and buyers enter into relationships for mutual gains, existing research has identified that 
suppliers and buyers may have different views on their relationships, which may lead to different 
motivations for collaboration behaviors, such as information sharing. For example, Whipple and Frankel 
(2000) found that trust was ranked as the most important factor in alliance success by buyers, while their 
supplier counterparts ranked trust as the second most important factor for success after senior 
management support.  
Suppliers and buyers can have different perceptions about the power wielded by their partners on them 
and also the power imposed by them on their partners. Corsten and Kumar (2005) found that suppliers 
were much more likely than buyers to feel inequity in obtaining benefits from the relationships. Since 
buyers and suppliers may often belong to different industries, the mimetic influence and normative 
influence may be different and thus have different impacts on their respective decisions on information 
sharing. 
Moreover, suppliers and buyers may share information for different purposes. Whipple et al. (2002) 
found that suppliers were more interested in timely information from their customers because suppliers 
rely on information from customers in order to start their internal planning processes, while buyers were 
more interested in accuracy of the information because if a problem arises, buyers need accurate 
information to adjust their procurement plans appropriately. Further, since information shared among 
partners is usually proprietary, buyers and suppliers might be exposed to opportunism by the other party. 
This concern can be further exacerbated if one party feels that it is sharing sensitive and valuable 
information often because of the power held by the supply chain partner. 
Given the lack of understanding of both suppliers and buyers perspectives on information sharing in 
supply chain management, we explore supplier and buyer similarities and differences. Following the logic 
of the existing literature on the different perspectives of suppliers and buyers, we posit the following 
hypothesis, 
H7: The proposed internal strategic factors, relation-specific power factors, and external institutional 
factors affect information sharing differently for suppliers and buyers 
Specifically, we test the model and hypothesized relationships separately using independent samples of 
suppliers and buyers. Multi-group invariance analysis is used to evaluate (1) if the hypotheses are 
supported similarly across the buyer and supplier sample; and (2) if the relationships between constructs 
are similar or different across the supplier and buyer samples.  
Research Methodology 
We developed our measures for constructs through successive stages of literature review, theoretical 
modeling, and refinement, as suggested by Churchill (1979). Whenever possible, existing measures were 
adopted and adapted to fit in our research context. All the measurement items and their informing 
sources are listed in Appendix A. 
General Topics 
6 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
Given the difficulties of collecting data of this complexity, e-Rewards1, a professional marketing research 
institution, was employed to gain access to its business panel members in the U.S. The membership 
profile of e-Rewards’ business panel2 is comparable to the membership profile of professional institutes, 
such as the Institute of Supply Management (ISM)3. E-mail invitations stating the purpose of the research 
were sent by e-Rewards to its panel members. Based on their profiles, members willing to participate were 
directed to an online survey about either their information sharing activities with their buyers or with 
their suppliers. Of the 367 sales professionals and 375 procurement professionals who received the 
invitation, 140 (completion rate = 38.1%) and 124, respectively completed the surveys (completion rate = 
33.1%). In both samples, over 70percent of the respondents have a job title of sales/procurement or mid-
level manager. On average, the sales professionals have been in their functional role for 7.4 years (S.D. = 
5.0) and the procurement professionals have 6.9 years of experience in their functional role (S.D. = 6.2). 
On a 1 (not at knowledgeable) to 7 (very knowledgeable) scale, 83.6 percent of sale professionals reported 
levels 6 and 7 (mean = 6.40, S.D. = 0.995), while 71.8 percent of procurement professionals reported 
levels 6 and 7 (mean = 6.05, S.D. = 1.414). Table 1 presents the summary information regarding the size 
and industry distribution of the two samples. 
Table 1: Demographic Information of the Two Samples 
  Suppliers Buyers 
Industry No. of Firms Percent No. of Firms Percent 
Automotive 53 37.9 43 34.7 
Chemicals 21 15.0 26 21.0 
Computer/Electronic Equipment 36 25.7 26 21.0 
Machinery/Equipment  30 21.4 29 23.4 
Number of Employees No. of Firms Percent No. of Firms Percent 
1 – 100  46 32.9 39 31.5 
101 –1,000 38 27.1 27 21.8 
1,001 – 10,000 24 17.1 20 16.1 
>10,000 32 22.9 38 30.6 
$ Sale (in Million) No. of Firms Percent No. of Firms Percent 
<10 26 18.6 24 19.4 
10 – 100  26 18.6 16 12.9 
100 – 1,000 23 16.4 12 9.7 
>1,000 32 22.9 30 24.2 
Missing 33 23.6 42 33.9 
 
Two tests were conducted to assess non-response bias after data collection. First, using ANOVA, we 
compared those respondents who did not complete the survey with those who did, based on both the 
number of employees in their firms and the firm’s annual revenue (Armstrong et al. 1977). Second, using a 
chi-square test, we examined the difference between the expected and the observed number of 
                                                             
1 www.e-rewards.com 
2  The U.S. business panel of e-Rewards (http://www.e-rewardsresearch.com/downloads/ 
US_Business_Panels.pdf (accessed on Jan. 25, 2009) 
3  Source: http://www.ism.ws/files/membership/MemDemReport2006.pdf (accessed on January 25, 
2009).  
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respondents across industries. No statistical differences were detected using these two tests, suggesting 
that non-response bias is not evident in the samples. 
As suggested in recent research, we took steps to safeguard against common methods bias when designing 
the instrument (Podasakoff et al. 2003).  Specifically, we separated our key measures stated above into 
several subsections and used different formats (e.g., circled responses vs. written responses) and scales to 
reduce simply “straight line” responses by managers. After data collection, Harmon’s one-factor test was 
conducted to investigate common method variance (Podasakoff et al. 1986). Using exploratory factor 
analysis, we estimated a model for each sample that had all items for the seven latent constructs, which 
revealed the presence of seven distinct factors with eigen values exceeding 1. The first factor accounts for 
27.4 percent of the total variance for the supplier sample and 28.9 percent of the total variance for the 
buyer sample. The rotated component matrix indicated that all items loaded on the corresponding factors.  
When we forced the extraction of a seven-factor model, results remained the same.  Finally, we included a 
common method factor in the structural model and the estimated results for all hypothesized effects were 
unchanged in terms of level of significance.  Taken together, these results suggest that common method 
bias is an unlikely concern in this study. 
Empirical Tests 
Descriptive statistics for both the supplier and the buyer samples are reported in Appendix B. The 
correlation matrix did not indicate any exceptionally correlated constructs. The highest correlation (0.61) 
is between normative influence and mimetic influence in the supplier sample, which is still below the 0.8 
threshold for caution on a lack of discriminant validity suggested by Bagozzi et al. (1991).  
Measurement model 
We adopted standard procedures to ensure the content validity and the construct validity of the measures, 
and to evaluate their psychometric properties (Bagozzi et al. 1991; Nunnally et al. 1994). We used 
covariance-based structural equation model using AMOS 18.0 to conduct a confirmatory factor analysis 
(CFA) to evaluate all items.  The overall fit of the measurement model was good for both the supplier and 
customer samples (Hu et al. 1999) (For the supplier sample: χ2 = 638.129, df = 410, χ2/ df =1.556, CFI= 
0.900, NNFI = 0.868, RMSEA = 0.067; for the buyer sample, χ2 = 720.908, df = 410, χ2/ df =1.758, CFI = 
0.890, NNFI = 0.818, RMSEA = 0.074). All measures exhibited high convergent validity with composite 
reliability (bolded item in Appendix A) and Cronbach’s α (bolded items in parentheses) higher than 
0.800, and all items loaded strongly and significantly on their respective factors (Appendix A). 
Discriminant validity was supported as the average variance extracted for each latent factor exceeded the 
respective squared correlation between factors (Fornell et al. 1981) (Appendix B).  Also, when each 
pairwise correlation was constrained to 1, the model fit deteriorated significantly, providing additional 
evidence of discriminant validity (Anderson et al. 1988; Hu et al. 1999).   
Finally, we evaluated the measurement invariance of the constructs across the supplier and buyer samples 
by progressively incorporating restrictive equality constraints to the measurement model across the two 
groups. In sequence, we imposed equality constraints to the measurement weights and the structural 
covariances (Steenkamp et al. 1998). We did not constrain the equivalence of measurement residuals as it 
is widely accepted to be overly restrictive (Byrne 2001; Meredith 1993). For each of the constrained 
models, the overall model fit indices remained comparable to the unconstrained model.  The CFI did not 
drop by more than 0.011 for any of the restrictive models in comparison to the unconstrained model, 
providing strong evidence of configural and metric invariance across the buyer and supplier sample 
(Cheung et al. 2002) (Table 2). We can thus meaningfully interpret similarities and differences in the 
structural relationships among constructs across the two samples. Collectively, these results suggest that 
all measures exhibit satisfactory validity and can be meaningfully used for hypothesis testing. 
Table 2: Measurement Invariance Test for the Supplier and the Buyer Samples 
Model χ2 df χ2/ df CFI NNFI RMSEA 
Unconstrained 1359.037 820 1.657 0.894 0.875 0.050 
Measurement Weights 1399.113 844 1.658 0.891 0.868 0.050 
Structural Covariances 1467.910 872 1.683 0.883 0.857 0.053 
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Results 
A structural model was estimated to assess the effects shown in Figure 1 and compare the results across 
the two samples (Byrne 2001). The overall model provided a good fit to the data (χ2 = 1485.576, df = 846, 
χ2/ df =1.756, CFI=0.905, NNFI = 0.872, RMSEA=0.063). Since the sample size of both the supplier and 
the buyer samples is slightly smaller than the recommended threshold (five times the number of 
measurement items), we also tested our research model using PLS and OLS, both of which returned the 
same results with even stronger relationships in terms of higher path coefficients and more significant 
results. Due to the recent criticism of PLS’s and OLS’s suboptimal ability to handle multi-item constructs 
and inability to compare groups, we choose to report the SEM results in this study. 
As reported in Table 3, five out of the six hypothesized paths are significant at p<0.05 for the supplier 
sample. In accordance with our proposed hypotheses, top management participation (H1), coercive power 
on the firm (H3), coercive power by the firm (H4), and normative influence on supply chain management 
(H6) positively affect the information sharing activities of suppliers. These results suggest that the 
proposed research model was generally supported by the results from the supplier sample.  
Surprisingly, we did not find relational orientation to significantly impact information sharing in the 
supplier sample. This lack of effect may be because suppliers in general would always prefer getting repeat 
business from the customers and to that extent may be more transaction oriented rather than adopt 
relational orientation for sharing information with their customers. Viewed together with the difference 
across the supplier and buyer samples with respect to power, it can be seen that the supplier sample 
perceives coercive power to play a significant role in the extent to which they share information.  In 
contrast, the relationship is not significant in the buyer subsample.  This suggests the when dealing with 
downstream supply chain partners, firms perceive coercive power to play a greater role in shaping their 
information sharing behavior rather than a relational orientation.  
While mimetic influence on supply chain management of the focal firm (H5) has a significant effect on 
information sharing, it is the opposite of our hypothesized positive impact. A possible explanation for this 
quite surprising result is that mimetic influence functions in the model primarily as a suppressor of 
variance in other predictors and that it is irrelevant to the dependent variable. A post hoc analysis of the 
zero-order correlation confirms this suspicion and reveals that mimetic influence suppresses the variance 
of normative influence.  This may indicate that information sharing among supply chain partners bears 
risks and is complicated in terms of how and what to share with partners, which make it difficult for the 
focal firm to mimic information sharing activities directly from competitors. Rather, companies may be 
inclined to hire the same type of supply chain professionals as their peers in order to mimic their supply 
chain processes. Thus, the mimetic influence exerts its effect on information sharing by the nature of 
hiring by the focal firm where they hire the same kind of professionals who are then likely to follow  
industry practices similar to their peers. 
Only three out of the six hypothesized relationships are significant for the buyer sample. It is interesting 
to notice that only one of the two factors in each category is significant and it is important to note that the 
three significant relationships are very strong (p<0.01). Of the two strategic factors, relationship 
orientation has a significant impact on information sharing (H2) while top management participation has 
no significant effect (H1). This suggests that sharing information by buyers is more likely when they view 
their suppliers as long-term trusted partners. Since the buyers need to share private and sensitive 
information, such as marketing campaigns, planning and sales information, there exists a greater risk of 
exposure that suppliers may act opportunistically with such information. But long-term cooperation can 
cultivate trust and incur joint asset- and relational-specific investment from both parties, which can 
safeguard against opportunistic behavior (Anderson et al. 1989). Thus, buyers may be more willing to 
share information with long-term trusted suppliers. The results also highlight the differences in relational 
orientation across the two subsamples of suppliers and buyers. Of the two power factors, the coercive 
power by the firm has significant impact on information sharing (H4) while coercive power on the firm 
has no significant effect (H3). This result indicates that the buyers perceive themselves to wield more 
power over their suppliers and that it plays a greater role in information sharing. It may well be that they 
are only willing to share information when they perceive that they have relative power/control over their 
suppliers. Of the two institutional factors, the normative influence of SCM has a significant impact on 
information sharing (H6) while mimetic influence of SCM has no significant effect (H5). This shows that 
 Supplier and Buyers Perspectives on Information Sharing 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 9 
buyers are more likely to following institutionalized professional norms on information sharing, but less 
likely to adopt supply chain practices in response to practices adopted by competitors.  
Table 3: SEM Results 
 Hypothesized Path Supplier a Buyer a Difference 
Significance 
H1 Top Management Participation  Information 
Sharing 
0.134* n.s.  
H2 Relationship Orientation  Information Sharing n.s. 0.354**  
H3 Coercive Power on the Firm  Information Sharing 0.238* n.s.  
H4 Coercive Power by the Firm  Information Sharing 0.183* 0.307** 0.000 
H5 Mimetic Influence on SCM  Information Sharing -0.198* n.s.  
H6 Normative Influence on SCM  Information Sharing 0.209* 0.284** 0.000 
a Standardized path coefficients are reported 
* p<0.05  **p<0.01 
 
While the test results suggest that internal strategic, relation-specific power, and external institutional 
factors affect the information sharing behaviors for both the suppliers and buyers, different and 
interesting patterns of significance emerge from the two samples when we compare them (Table 3), which 
provides strong support for H7. First, suppliers and buyers appear to have quite different views on what 
strategic factors motivate information sharing behaviors. While top management participation has a 
significant positive effect on information sharing in the supplier sample, it has no impact on information 
sharing for the buyer sample. Similarly, while relational orientation has no effect on information sharing 
in the supplier sample, it strongly influences information sharing in the buyer sample. These results 
indicate that suppliers believe that top management participation can influence the extent of information 
sharing with buyers, while buyers tend to share information with suppliers when they view them as long-
term partners.  
Second, suppliers’ and buyers’ views on the influence of power factors on information sharing reveal both 
similarities and differences. While suppliers perceive that they are subject to the coercive power of buyers 
to share their information, buyers are less likely, if not completely unlikely, to share information in 
response to the coercive power of suppliers. While both suppliers and buyers believe that they will share 
information with their partners when they feel they have coercive power over their partners, buyers 
appear to perceive it to play a greater role when it comes to sharing information with their suppliers. 
These results reveal the perceived inequitable position of suppliers and buyers in influencing the extent to 
which information is shared in relationships. The results suggest that buyers are more inclined to share 
information when they perceive that they have the dominant position in the relationship. This finding is 
consistent with the literature that found more examples of buyer firms initiating trust-building actions 
when compared to the actions taken by supplier firms (McCutcheon and Stuart 2000). 
Third, the two institutional factors have different impacts on information sharing for the supplier and 
buyer samples. While mimetic force has significant negative effect on information sharing for the supplier 
sample, it has no effect in the buyer sample. While both suppliers and buyers acknowledge the influence 
of industrial norms on their sharing behaviors, buyers are much more likely to be subject to normative 
influences. These results indicate that firms do not perceive themselves to be subject to the strong 
influence of industrial norms. 
Discussion 
Despite recognition of the role of inter-firm relationships in creating sustainable value, many firms have 
failed to realize the anticipated benefits of such relationships, which has been attributed to their inability 
General Topics 
10 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011  
to leverage information flows within the supply chain (Hsu et al. 2008). In order to take advantage of 
partner firm capabilities firms need to share information and support these with IT platforms for 
information exchange. The role of IT infrastructure in building and maintaining collaborative 
relationships is well recognized (Gosain et al. 2004; Rai et al. 2006). In markets with rapidly shrinking 
product life cycles, firms must continuously design and deliver high-quality products and services in a 
timely manner. Lack of information sharing limits a firm’s ability to leverage collaborative relationships 
for improved firm performance. In this study, we integrate strategic management, resource-dependency 
perspective and institutional theory to examine the strategic, power, and institutional factors that affect 
the extent of information sharing among supply chain partners and the different perspectives of suppliers 
and buyers. Specifically, we make the following four theoretical contributions to the literature on 
information sharing in supply chain management. 
 
First, we highlight the internal strategic role of top management participation and relational orientation 
in shaping the information sharing activities for both suppliers and buyers. Our results indicate that 
suppliers perceive the importance of active participation of top management in articulating a vision and 
formulating strategy for supply chain management to establish legitimacy of information sharing. Buyers 
on the other hand perceive the need for relational orientation to promote investment on relationship-
specific assets and experience-based assets to facilitate information sharing among partners. Our results 
confirm that the strategic position of the supply chain practice affects the information sharing behavior of 
the focal firm. 
Second, we delineate the effects of power on the firm and power by the firm on information sharing in 
supply chain management by making the distinction between power exerted by the organization and the 
pressure it perceives as being exerted by its supply chain partners.  This enables us to identify the context 
under which relative power of partners shapes information sharing. Notably, the study contrasts the 
distinction between the influence of power (by the firm and on the firm) by comparing the results from 
the supplier and buyer samples, a distinction that has not been examined extensively in prior research.  
Our results reiterate the notion that the buyers tend to wield power on the suppliers.  Suppliers perceive 
that their participation in information sharing is more influenced by the power held by their customers.  
More importantly, the results indicate that buyers are more comfortable sharing internal and sensitive 
information with their suppliers when they perceive that they have power over them. 
Third, we extend the current literature on information sharing by incorporating institutional theory into 
our model. We view the focal firm as embedded in a social network, whose behaviors would be affected by 
the institutional environment in which it is situated.  Our results suggest that the firms are more likely to 
share information with their supply chain partners by hiring the same kind of supply chain professionals 
and complying with industry standards on supply chain practice. The surprising negative and 
insignificant impacts of mimetic influence on information sharing for suppliers and buyers respectively 
indicates that information sharing bears risks and uncertainties and is more complicated in terms of how 
and what information can be shared among partners, which in turn makes it difficult for the focal firm to 
copy directly from its competitors.    
Fourth, we reveal the different perspectives of suppliers and buyers on the impacts of strategic, power, 
and institutional factors on information sharing among partners by comparing and contrasting the test 
results across supplier and buyer samples. The distinct results from the two samples suggest that the 
inability of the focal firm to leverage information flows within the supply chain may be due to the different 
perspective of its partners on information sharing and the distinct functional roles within the firm across 
sales and procurement. The differences between the two functional roles of the focal firm, as a buyer and 
as a supplier are interesting and insightful.  Rather than take a unidimensional view of a focal firm, our 
research suggests that approach to supply chain management is more nuanced and dependent on the 
context of whether the supply chain is viewed upstream or downstream from the focal firm.  The 
differences maybe in the relational vs. transactional orientation of different functional roles in the firm’s 
supply chain.  Alternatively, they may be due to the attention top management gives to the firm’s 
upstream vs. downstream roles.   
Our results bring valuable insights to supply chain management professionals. Based on our study, the 
supply chain management professionals can evaluate their current partner management strategy to find 
areas that they can work on to improve or facilitate information sharing. Rather than simply forcing the 
 Supplier and Buyers Perspectives on Information Sharing 
  
 Thirty Second International Conference on Information Systems, Shanghai 2011 11 
supplying company to provide the required information, the buying company can get it by involving itself 
in interaction routines and collaborative initiatives. The supplying company would be more willing to 
participate in this type of collaboration if it feels that it can have a say in the decision-making process. 
Similarly, the supplying company can influence the information sharing behavior of the buying company 
through establishing a long-term relationship and giving it a dominant feeling in the relationship. For 
both types of companies, it would be easier to get support from their partners if information sharing is 
considered to be the industry norm or standard for doing business. 
Conclusion 
Our research calls for further research initiatives on comparing supplier and buyer perspectives on the 
different aspects of supply chain management. This type of comparison research could help suppliers and 
buyers identify mismatches between their expectations about the relationship and formulate effective 
strategies to promote collaborative initiatives with partners.  Rather than viewing the supply chain as 
isomorphic irrespective of the different roles played by the focal firm in a supply chain, the research 
recognizes the differences and highlights the factors that shape information sharing that are dependent on 
the supplier vs. buyer role of the focal firm in a supply chain. 
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APPENDIX A: Questionnaire with Informing Source and Path Loading 
 Suppliers Buyers 
Top Management Participation in SCM (Chatterjee et al. 2002; 





TMP1 Senior management of our firm/SBU actively participates in 
articulating a vision for the supply chain. 
0.946 0.953 
TMP2 Senior management of our firm/SBU actively participates in 
formulating a strategy for the supply chain. 
0.957 0.957 
TMP3 Senior management of our firm/SBU actively participates in 
establishing goals and standards for supply chain initiatives.  
0.950 0.948 




RO1 Maintaining long-term relationships with our buyers/suppliers is 
important to us. 
0.836 0.823 
RO2 We believe that goodwill and trust form the basis of our relationship 
with buyers/suppliers. 
0.884 0.849 
RO3 We focus on long-term goals in our relationship with our 
buyers/suppliers. 
0.853 0.894 
RO4 Our buyers/suppliers care about the success of our relationship. 0.753 0.801 
RO5 There is a strong bond of loyalty between us and our 
buyers/suppliers. 
0.771 0.876 




COF1 Our main buyers/suppliers require us to adopt procedures and 
policies specified by them. 
0.769 0.704 
COF2 Our main buyers/suppliers require us to require our IT 
platform/applications to interface with their systems seamlessly 
0.779 0.739 
COF3 Our main buyers/suppliers require us to execute supply chain 
processes in a specific manner 
0.843 0.785 
COF4 Our main buyers/suppliers require us to provide data in specified 
formats. 
0.819 0.891 




CBF1 We require our buyers/suppliers to require their IT 
platform/applications to interface with our systems seamlessly. 
0.884 0.744 
CBF2 We require our buyers/suppliers to provide data in specified formats. 0.852 0.902 
CBF3 We require our buyers/suppliers to execute supply chain processes in 
a specific manner. 
0.893 0.890 
CBF4 We require our buyers/suppliers to adopt procedures and policies 
specified by us. 
0.747 0.858 





Our main competitor(s) are successful because their supply chain is 
0.565 0.639 
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highly integrated with their suppliers (customers). 
MIF2 We admire firms with highly integrated supply chains. 0.893 0.831 
MIF3 Buyers/Suppliers in our industry are more willing to do business with 
firms with highly integrated supply chains. 
0.919 0.850 
MIF4 We have to offer similar supply chain capabilities as our main 
competitor(s) in order to compete. 
0.776 0.796 




NIF1 There are a standard set of supply chain practices in our industry. 0.675 0.794 
NIF2 We closely follow best practices put forth by professional (for ex 
APICS, CSCMP etc.) and industry associations. 
0.871 0.877 
NIF3 Most of our personnel are professionally qualified and/or certified in 
supply chain, logistics, purchasing or related area. 
0.850 0.729 




IS1 Details of upcoming product or service related changes 0.608 0.723 
IS2 Future plans (such as promotion and marketing plans, long-term 
production plans, capital investments, capacity utilization, etc.) 
0.740 0.764 
IS3 Information related to market demand trends and forecasts 0.840 0.800 
IS4 Information on demand shifts and changes in customer preferences 0.824 0.817 
IS5 Information about each other's internal processes 0.808 0.629 
IS6 Information on internal operating metrics (such as inventory levels, 
product availability, production volumes, etc.) 
0.785 0.718 
IS7 Information related to changes in Information content (such as catalog 
information, technical specifications, part numbers, etc.) 
0. 727 0.647 
IS8 Information related to each other's performance 0.716 0.792 
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APPENDIX B: Descriptive Statistics 
  Constructs Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
AVE 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 AVE Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
1 Top Management Participation 5.66 1.22 0.90  0.26 0.21 0.36 0.52 0.51 0.30 0.91 5.67 1.37 
2 Relational Orientation 5.96 0.83 0.67 0.32  0.04 0.12 0.41 0.32 0.43 0.72 5.92 0.80 
3 Coercive Power on the Firm 5.01 1.32 0.64 0.14 0.21  0.05 0.13 0.17 0.03 0.52 3.82 1.51 
4 Coercive Power by the Firm 4.29 1.51 0.72 0.08 -0.03 0.41  0.40 0.37 0.37 0.72 5.24 1.32 
5 Mimetic Influence on SCM 5.22 1.14 0.64 0.33 0.28 0.38 0.37  0.46 0.33 0.61 5.32 1.05 
6 Normative Influence on SCM 4.92 1.25 0.65 0.51 0.25 0.30 0.38 0.64  0.40 0.64 5.04 1.23 
7 Information Sharing 4.48 1.19 0.58 0.24 0.12 0.30 0.26 0.13 0.28   0.55 4.71 1.14 
 
*The table below the diagonal presents descriptive statistics for the supplier dataset (n= 140), the above presents descriptive statistics for the buyer 
dataset (n=124). 
** Bolded items are significant at P<0.05, two-tailed t-test. 
 
 
 
 
 
